Sentora seeks 50% of Aave V4 revenue; suppliers absorb shortfalls

Sentora asked Aave DAO on Sept. 28 for permission to operate an isolated Aave V4 Hub on Ethereum and to receive 50% of the instance’s protocol revenue. The request was posted as an ARFC and would grant Sentora revocable operational roles to run the Hub and its Spokes while the DAO would retain contract ownership and the ability to revoke those roles on-chain.

Under the proposal Sentora would operate a single Hub and multiple Spokes that draw liquidity from that Hub, with no credit lines to other Aave DAO Hubs. The plan limits borrowable assets to RLUSD, PYUSD and OUSD and explicitly excludes USDC and USDT. Sentora would set collateral lists, interest-rate curves, liquidation parameters and oracles for the markets it runs. The DAO’s Governance Short Executor would keep admin control of the Hub, Spokes and AccessManager contracts, and the DAO would remain the formal contract owner able to grant or revoke Sentora’s operational roles.

The governance design assigns different action windows for risk responses. Under a restrictive role, Sentora’s operational address could pause or freeze a reserve, halt an asset or stop a Spoke immediately. A one-way Risk Steward action to reduce collateral factors or tighten caps could be executed immediately. Changes that increase risk, such as raising borrow limits, adjusting rate models or changing liquidation settings, would be subject to a 48-hour on-chain delay that makes the scheduled change visible but does not create a mechanism to cancel that single action inside the window. Adding a new collateral asset or deploying another Hub would require a two-week forum review; an objection from an appointed Aave DAO service provider would pause the rollout and send it to a binding Snapshot vote.

The proposal excludes the instance from the formal mandates of Aave’s existing risk service providers. It does not assign those providers to monitor the instance, make parameter recommendations or handle incident response, and it does not provide compensation for such oversight. Providers could still raise concerns on their own initiative, but no obligation or dedicated reviewer is defined. Sentora CEO Anthony DeMartino wrote that “risk management needs measurable controls and continuous monitoring,” and the ARFC places that continuous operating role with Sentora rather than with DAO-appointed monitors.

On losses, a Spoke that generates a shortfall would report it to the Hub that supplied the borrowed asset; the Hub would record the deficit against that asset. Under TokenLogic’s V4 Umbrella framework, suppliers of the Hub asset would bear the loss. The isolated structure prevents draws on other DAO Hubs but does not shield suppliers inside Sentora’s Hub from losses originating from its own Spokes. The Sentora ARFC names no explicit deficit backstop, no Sentora-funded first-loss layer, and no Umbrella market that would cover the Hub. A separate V4 Umbrella ARFC proposes deficit offsets and staked coverage for core assets but does not name Sentora’s proposed Hub.

Revenue would be split 50% to Sentora and 50% to the Aave DAO, with that share including reserve-factor earnings and protocol liquidation fees. The ARFC includes inconsistent references to asset and oracle lists: the narrative refers to USDe and PST backing initial RLUSD loans with PRIME and mWIN added later, the technical specification lists additional assets, and a Bluechip section names RLUSD borrowing against kBTC while another table lists RLUSD, PYUSD and OUSD. The OUSD oracle is not yet confirmed.

The request remains an ARFC for community discussion. If the DAO elects to consider it, the next governance steps would be a Snapshot vote followed by an on-chain Aave Improvement Proposal. Before any approval, the DAO must decide whether to grant revocable operating rights that allow Sentora to manage day-to-day credit risk without an assigned independent watcher and without specified first-loss protection. Prospective suppliers will need to evaluate the final asset list, oracle choices and any explicit deficit coverage to assess the exposure behind the DAO-held contract keys.