Polymarket Hit by Second Multimillion-Dollar Breach

Polymarket restored trading after a compromised third-party service disrupted its prediction market on Oct. 29. More than 700 users had about $3.46 million in assets compromised.

Polymarket restricted trading from 18:05 UTC to 19:05 UTC on Oct. 29 after code linked to a third-party monitoring service disrupted its prediction market. Blockchain analytics firm Bubblemaps estimated that more than 700 users had about $3.46 million in assets compromised.

Polymarket recorded the incident as resolved after fixing the issue. The company referred the matter to law enforcement and said it would fully reimburse affected users.

Bubblemaps estimated that attackers converted about $2.7 million of the assets into POL tokens and transferred them away from the platform. About $750,000 remained on Polymarket when the assessment was conducted.

An analysis of the recovered code found that it searched for Polymarket’s live trading client and its signer. The signer is the website component that requests a user’s cryptographic approval for transactions. The code contained different instructions for different account types, including requests to transfer position tokens or move sale proceeds.

The analysis did not establish whether the code executed trades, obtained signatures without clear user approval, stole private keys or gave attackers a complete list of victims and recipients. Metadata from a production build showed that the monitoring script was later removed, but did not establish when users stopped being exposed.

The incident followed a June 25 attack involving a compromised marketing dependency. The malicious script reportedly drained about $3 million from Polymarket users. It targeted wallets holding more than $100,000 and repeatedly requested digital authorizations. Approved transactions were then submitted through Polymarket’s relayer, the system used to process signed actions.

Polymarket removed the affected June dependency and committed to refunding users in full. The June code sought approved authorizations, while the October code searched for trading and signing functions within an active website session.

A third-party script included directly in a webpage can access other scripts and data on that page. Hosting the script on another domain does not remove that access. A script loaded in a separate frame operates under a different browser security boundary. Security controls that can reduce such access include limiting third-party code on trading pages, restricting signer permissions and requiring fresh confirmation for sensitive transactions. Subresource Integrity can make a browser compare a downloaded script with a predefined cryptographic fingerprint and reject a changed file.

Polymarket’s incident record and the available security analyses do not establish the full exposure period or the final number of affected users in the October attack. The company has not provided a detailed account of the affected accounts, authorization requests and transaction paths.

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