Optimism plan would replace Security Council elections
Optimism’s draft manual would let an elected Council Lead nominate Security Council members. Tokenholders could block each nominee with 20% of active delegated OP voting power.
The Optimism Foundation submitted the ratification proposal on Oct. 22. It would give the elected Council Lead responsibility for recruiting, interviewing and nominating participants who approve protocol upgrades and respond to security incidents. The Token House, Optimism’s tokenholder governance body, would retain the power to veto nominees and remove the Lead.
As of Oct. 25, the proposed manual was still marked as a draft, while the main Operating Manual remained at version 2.0.0. Ratification would take place before a Council Lead election. The new rules would take effect when that election is completed, and existing Security Council signers would remain in place until replacements were confirmed.
The Lead would submit nominees separately. Each candidate would have one week for review and a second week for veto voting. A veto would block an appointment if it reached 20% of active votable OP supply. The Lead would then have to submit a replacement through a new proposal. Blocking one nominee would not affect other appointments.
Optimism’s rules define votable supply as OP delegated for governance participation. That voting power is considered active when it has been used within the previous six months. The voting-power snapshot would be taken when the veto period begins. Veto proposals would not be subject to the standard 30% turnout quorum.
The Foundation cited low candidate participation, reluctance among qualified candidates to campaign and limited time for delegates to conduct detailed assessments as reasons for the proposed system. The Lead’s evaluation would begin the selection process, while tokenholders could challenge a candidate’s qualifications, affiliations or conflicts of interest.
At least half of the Council’s members would have to come from outside Optimism Core Development teams. No more than one member could be directly associated with a single entity. The number of members living in any one country would have to remain below the number needed to approve a multisignature action.
The Lead could not nominate someone associated with the Lead or a person involved in an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Foundation would conduct interviews and know-your-customer or know-your-business screening before publishing a nomination. Each public nomination would include verifiable qualifications, conflict disclosures and confirmation that screening was complete.
The Lead would also have to disclose the number of applications and interviews and answer delegate questions during the review period. Tokenholders would retain a separate process for removing the Lead. A removal proposal would require a 30% quorum based on active votable supply and approval by at least 51% of yes-or-no votes.
The proposed system would determine who participates in signing decisions assigned to the Security Council. The Council handles governance-approved upgrades and role changes and can take defined emergency actions without separate approval for each response. The Lead would not hold signing keys or direct substantive signing decisions.
On Oct. 22, the Optimism Foundation and Uniswap Labs announced preparations for an interoperability setup connecting Unichain and OP Mainnet. The initial proposed use would support native ETH transfers, subject to technical readiness and separate governance approval. Future activation would require details on shared settlement, dispute infrastructure, an ETHLockbox, contracts, timing and incident procedures.








