Fearless Wallet Breach Exposed Polkadot Keys for 20 Months

Fearless Wallet’s browser extension exposed private keys for about 20 months. Eight users reported unauthorized transfers involving 17,286 DOT, while faster staking withdrawals narrowed recovery time.

The Fearless Wallet browser extension exposed Polkadot users’ recovery phrases, private keys and keystore files for about 20 months, potentially allowing unauthorized transfers. The Polkadot Community Foundation disclosed the breach on Oct. 21 after an investigation by the Polkadot Technical Fellowship.

Eight users reported unauthorized transactions involving 17,286 DOT. The foundation urged anyone who had used the extension to create a new keypair with a different wallet and move any remaining funds. Its warning read: “If you have used the Fearless Wallet browser extension, please create a new keypair with a different wallet and move your funds as soon as possible.”

Blockchain security firm SlowMist identified versions 3.0.1 and 3.0.3 through 3.0.5 as affected. The malicious code could collect wallet credentials when users unlocked the extension and transmit them to an external server through HTTP requests.

A remote configuration system allowed the malicious function to be turned on or off. Investigators found that the code was removed from the source in June and that the remote control was disabled in October. Those changes did not protect credentials that had already been exposed.

The breach raised concerns about Polkadot’s staking changes under Referendum 1910, which took effect on July 6. The upgrade reduced the maximum unbonding period for nominators from 28 days to two days and removed slashing penalties for nominators. Depending on the staking schedule, newly initiated nominator withdrawals can become transferable in about 24 to 48 hours.

Previously, an attacker who began unstaking compromised DOT could face a waiting period of up to four weeks before the funds became transferable. That delay could give account owners or recovery specialists more time to detect suspicious activity and intervene.

The shorter withdrawal period has not been identified as the cause of the unauthorized transfers reported by Fearless Wallet users. The timing varies by account. Unbonding requests made before the upgrade kept their earlier schedules, while validators and some other locked balances remain subject to different rules.

PAPI Rescue, a recovery service developed by the polkadot-api team, warned on June 30 that reducing the unbonding period could leave little time to respond to compromised accounts. Polkadot has directed users with staked or restricted funds to consider recovery options before unstaking, since starting an exit can affect when the assets become transferable.

PAPI Rescue reports recovering more than $250,000 from compromised accounts and a 100% success rate among eligible cases it has handled. The service checks ownership and whether Polkadot’s transaction and staking rules still prevent the funds from moving. It does not guarantee recovery and may be unable to help after assets become transferable or have already been moved.

Polkadot’s investigators did not find the same malicious code in the reviewed Fearless Wallet mobile applications. Users who imported an exposed recovery phrase or private key into another wallet remain at risk because attackers may already possess the credentials.

Reinstalling the extension, changing a password or importing the same recovery phrase into another wallet would not resolve the exposure. The foundation warned users against unsolicited recovery offers and advised them never to disclose private keys, including to people claiming to provide recovery services.

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